1 The Consumer Problem:
• k 0 , b 0 given; b are bonds; r t , w t are profits and wages, net of taxes.
First order conditions:
w t u 0 (c t )−v 0 (L t ) = 0 t = 0, 1, ... u 0 (c t )−βr t+1 u 0 (c t+1 ) = 0 t = 0, 1, ...
The Optimal Taxation Problem:
Choose {r t , w t , c t , k t , L t , b t } to
(u(c t ) − v(L t ))β t subject to:
u 0 (c t ) − βr t+1 u 0 (c t+1 ) = 0,
r t ≥ 0, for all t = 0, 1, . . ., with k 0 , b 0 given.
3 Lagrangean:
wrt k t :
This condition can be expressed as :
The foc with respect to c t is:
where we define (γ * β)
The foc wrt b t , r t , w t , L t are:
The above equations, together with the initial conditions and transversality conditions, define the system to be studied.
Value of a Steady State:
Fix k, and find the value of keeping k as a steady state, at equilibrium:
subject to:
where we have used:
In addition, if the incentive constraint is binding:
(10) If not the condition is replaced by the Chamley-Judd result:
Definition 1 : Let 8,9 and 10 (11) . Then it is a candidate steady state.
RESULT:Suppose that the constrained capital stock k * is larger than k g : then capital is subsidized at the steady state.
Note: βf k (k g , L(k g ) = 1; βr = 1. The result follows from showing that
because k 2 > k g and because it can be shown that L(k) is decreasing on (k g, k 2 ).
Lagrange Multipliers:
At steady state, one finds, (multiplier for budget constraint):
and (multiplier for incentive constraints)
Linear utility: (identifies L as largest)
If the defection value function V D is strictly concave, and
and k g > k 2 ,then the only constrained steady state which satisfies the necessary condition for optimality is k 2 . (k * above)
Budget constraints and feasibility gives
or, using e = 1, w = V 0 (L) = L, and the deviation r = 0, we get:
given k has one positive solution if Ak ≥ G, and two if Ak < G; the two solutions are:
L 2 (k) is chosen (it is the better one u is linear) and we obtain the value of deviation:
Let e = 1, ² = 0. RESULT: For both steady states k = 0 and k = k * , 1 + a ∈ (0, β −1 ). RESULT: For values of G large enough, and A, k 0 small enough, the optimal path does not converge to k * .
RESULT:
and taxes on capital are negative. • Increasing ² (curvature) causes subsidy at k 2 and the tax at k 1 to go up.
• As labor becomes more inelastic (e increases) subsidies at k 2 increase: it is easier to finance capital because wuth inelastic labor the distortion of labor taxes is lower.
• However since k 1 (and
)declines while the marginal product at k g is β −1 , capital taxes at k 1 increase. • k is the private good; g is the public good; y is the output, equal to:
The public good is produced in quantity:
Social Rate Of Return on Capital:
Social rate of return: φ(τ ) Private Return on Capital:
The Consumer:
where M t is a government transfer.
The Equilibrium Fix a sequence of tax rates. At equilibrium:
Derivation
The first order condition of the agent gives:
(13) As is conventional we assume that
so that 13 becomes c 0 +
Iterating the first order conditions for the agent we get
which, substituted into 15 gives
If we now substitute the 16 into the expression for the utility of the agent we get that the utility from an initial capital k 0 and a tax rate sequence τ = (τ 0 , τ 1 , . . .), denoted by V (k 0 , τ ), is
Now we can use the equation 17 to substitute for c 0 , and obtain the value to the agent in terms of k 0 and τ only. To lighten notation, we introduce:
and
Now we can write 
For the Y term we get
We can now substitute in the equation giving the value to the agent:
Now we assume that β σ R(τ s ) σ φ −1 (τ s ) < 1 (it can be shown this condition is necessary for the value of the program to be bounded and for an optimum to exist). Therefore,
This, together with the optimality condition
implies that
as claimed.
The Third Best
This equivalent to the following simple problem, which is independent of the initial capital stock: 
